Tuesday, December 28, 2010

Ralph Nader -- The Whistle Has Been Blown, But Where's the Enforcement? Drug Industry Fraud

Counter-Punch
December 28, 2010
By RALPH NADER


The corporate defrauding of taxpayers (eg. Medicaid and Medicare) and prescription drugs with skyrocketing prices was the subject of a report by Public Citizen's Dr. Sidney Wolfe and his associates (see citizen.org).

Dr. Wolfe's team compiled a total of 165 federal and state settlements since 1991 totaling $19.8 billion in penalties. A key finding is that the drug industry's penalties under the Federal False Claims Act exceed even those assessed against the overcharging defense industry for fraud.

Before we become overly impressed with the cumulative amount of the penalties, specialists in corporate crime law enforcement believe that adding more federal cops on the corporate crime beat, backed by a determined law and order Justice Department with White House backing, would have greatly increased the number of cases and imposition of penalties on these drug industry giants.

Nonetheless, Dr. Wolfe's study shows that the pace of penalties has picked up over the past five years. This is due to "a combination of increased violations by companies and increased law enforcement on the part of federal and state governments," says the report.

Many of these cases were initiated by company whistleblowers, who under the False Claims Act can receive a share of the settlements. Since the corporate bosses of these drug firms are almost never prosecuted, what these executives fear the most are company employees who go public with the evidence of corporate misdeeds.

These violations do more than financial damage to consumers and government health insurance programs. One of the worst violations involves companies promoting unproven, often dangerous uses for their medicines. Last year, Pfizer paid $1.2 billion for illegal off-label promotion -the largest criminal fine in U.S.history. Other major corporate violators were GlaxoSmithKline, Eli Lilly, Schering-Plough, Bristol-Myers Squibb, AstraZeneca, TAP Pharmaceutical, Merck, Serono, Purdue, Allergan, Novartis, Cephalon, Johnson & Johnson, Forest Laboratories, Sanofi-aventis, Bayer, Mylan, Teva and King Pharmaceuticals.

The violations by these and other drug companies point to the wide range of impacts, including taking many lives of patients, which stems from these recurrent activities. These criminal or civil illegalities cover (1) overcharging government health programs, (2) unlawful promotion, (3) monopoly practices, (4) kickbacks, (5) concealing study findings, (6) poor manufacturing practices, (7) environmental violations, (8) financial violations and (9) illegal distribution.

Outside the purview of the Public Citizen study are the ravages of counterfeit drugs and poorly inspected ingredients in drugs, now mostly coming from China and India, due to the outsourcing by U.S. and European drug companies in their thirst for even greater profits.

Drug company sales are huge, growing from $40 billion in 1990 to $234 billion in 2008, and far exceeding inflation with their annual price gouging. To make matters worse, in 2003, the Congressional Republicans, with decisive support from some Democrats, passed the drug benefit bill which explicitly prohibited Uncle Sam, the payer, from bargaining for volume discounts with drug companies.

With over 400 full-time drug company lobbyists putting pressure on Congress, and tens of millions of dollars flowing into the legislators' campaign coffers, budgets for federal investigators, prosecutors and inspectors are kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, crime in the suites pays over and over again, despite occasional penalties.

A bright spot is the increasing enforcement action at the state level.

By last year, 32 states had enacted false claims acts, including fourteen states that qualified as strong laws by federal standards.

Still, the Wolfe report concludes that the "current system of enforcement is not working." He gives the examples of the $7.44 billion in financial penalties assessed over the past twenty years on GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer, as compared to their combined total of $16.5 billion in global net profits in one year alone.

What would deter these illegal practices and risks to public safety? Dr. Wolfe says "the lack of criminal prosecution that would result in jailing of company executives." is key. Moreover, the report notes that "a felony conviction could result in their companies becoming ineligible for reimbursement from federal and state health programs, a critical source of pharmaceutical company revenues."

A flicker of hope that a little change is on the way came from the Food and Drug Administration's Deputy Chief Counsel for Litigation, Eric Blumberg. He indicated that the government is considering going after drug company executives for violations such as off-label promotions. He stated: ".unless the government shows more resolve to criminally charge individuals-at all levels in the corporate hierarchy--.we can not expect to make progress in deterring off-label promotion."

The problem is that the final operating decision is in the hands of the Justice Department-historically short-staffed and short-willed to entreaties for prosecution by the FDA and other regulatory agencies.

Furthermore, for over 30 years, the Justice Department has stone-walled requests that it start a corporate crime database as it has done with street crimes. Congress likes it this way, as it continues to cash corporate campaign checks.

Just last week, however, outgoing Judiciary Committee Chairman, Democrat John Conyers introduced a bill (H.R. 6545) to create such a corporate crime data base in the Justice Department. Well, as the saying goes, everything starts with a gesture!

Ralph Nader is the author of Only the Super-Rich Can Save Us!, a novel.

Labels: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Friday, December 10, 2010

Placebo fraud rocks the very foundation of modern medical science; thousands of clinical trials invalidated

Thursday, October 28, 2010
by Mike Adams, the Health Ranger


(NaturalNews) You know all those thousands of clinical trials conducted over the last few decades comparing pharmaceuticals to placebo pills? Well, it turns out all those studies must now be completely thrown out as utterly non-scientific. And why? Because the placebos used in the studies weren't really placebos at all, rendering the studies scientifically invalid.

This is the conclusion from researchers at the University of California who published their findings in the October issue of the Annals of Internal Medicine. They reviewed 167 placebo-controlled trials published in peer-reviewed medical journals in 2008 and 2009 and found that 92 percent of those trials never even described the ingredients of their placebo pills.

Why is this important? Because placebo pills are supposed to be inert. But nothing is inert, it turns out. Even so-called "sugar pills" contain sugar, obviously. And sugar isn't inert. If you're running a clinical trial on diabetics, testing the effectiveness of a diabetes drug versus a placebo then obviously your clinical trial is going to make the diabetes drug look better than placebo if you use sugar pills as your placebo.

Some placebo pills use olive oil which may actually improve heart health. Other placebo pills use partially-hydrogenated oils which harm heart health. Yet only 8 percent of clinical trials bothered to list the placebo ingredients at all!

Stay with me on this placebo issue... because it gets even more bizarre...

There are no FDA rules regarding placebos in clinical trials

It turns out there are absolutely no FDA rules regarding the choice or composition of placebos used in clinical trials. Technically, a clinical trial director could use eye of newt or lizard's legs as placebo and would not even be required to mention such nefarious details in the trial results. That would cause trouble, trouble, boil and bubble! (Shakespeare reference for all you literary fans...)

We already know that clinical trials are rife with fraud. Most of the clinical trials used by pharmaceutical companies to win FDA approval of their drugs, for example, are funded by pharmaceutical companies. And it is a verifiable fact that most clinical trials tend to find results that favor the financial interests of whatever organization paid for them. So what's to stop Big Pharma from scheming up the perfect placebo that would harm patients just enough to make their own drugs look good by comparison?

Fact: Placebos are usually provided by the very same company funding the clinical trial! Do you detect any room for fraud in this equation?

How drug companies can fake clinical trials with selected placebo pills

Placebo performance strongly influences whether drugs are approved by the FDA, by the way. As the key piece of information on its regulatory approval decisions, the FDA wants to know whether a drug works better than placebo. That's the primary requirement! If they work even 5% better than placebo, they are said to be "efficacious" (meaning they "work"). This is true even if the placebo was selected and used specifically to make the drug look good by comparison.

You see, if there are no regulations or rules regarding placebo, then none of the placebo-controlled clinical trials are scientifically valid.

It's amazing how medical scientists will get rough and tough when attacking homeopathy, touting how their own medicine is "based on the gold standard of scientific evidence!" and yet when it really comes down to it, their scientific evidence is just a jug of quackery mixed with a pinch of wishful thinking and a wisp of pseudoscientific gobbledygook, all framed in the language of scientism by members of the FDA who wouldn't recognize real science if they tripped and fell into a vat full of it.

Big Pharma and the FDA have based their entire system of scientific evidence on a placebo fraud! And if the placebo isn't a placebo, then the scientific evidence isn't scientific.

Oh, but wait. They'll call it science because they wish the placebo to be a placebo. Yep -- the clinical researchers are now psychics, mediums and fortune tellers who simply decree that little pill of olive oil to "be a placebo!" while waving their hands over it in a gesture borrowed from David Copperfield.

James Randi may have never seen a psychic transmute lead into gold, but he's no doubt seen doctors transmute biochemically active substances into totally inert materials merely by wishing them so! It's so amazing!

And this brings me to the really interesting "how-to" part of this article...


How to make your own placebo just like clinical researchers do

Are you wondering how to make your own FDA-approved, scientifically validated placebo? It's easier than you think.

Step 1 - Find something shaped like a pill. It could be a pill full of olive oil, white sugar, palm oil, fluoridated water, chalk dust, synthetic chemicals or just about anything you can imagine.

Step 2 - Close your eyes and get ready to concentrate.

Step 3 - This is the important part - Repeat out loud five times while turning counter-clockwise, "I am a scientific researcher practicing evidence-based medicine!" You must say this until you really, truly believe it. If you don't believe it strongly enough, the placebo effect will be ruined.

Step 4 - Thrust your palm in the direction of the placebo pills and shout, at the top of your voice, "You are now placebo!" You may feel a shiver of energy coursing through your body. That's the power of placebo reaching out to the pills.

The process is now complete. You may now use these placebo pills in any clinical trial and expect full approval of such use by your colleagues, famous medical journals and FDA regulators. (This is not a joke. This is the state of the art today in conventional medicine.)

Hope also has a huge role to place in all this. The more you hope your placebos are really placebos, the better results you'll get. In fact, in reporting on this whole fiasco, the lead researcher of the study uncovering all this, Dr Beatric Golomb, said, "We can only hope that this hasn't seriously systematically affected medical treatment."

But of course it has. (And by the way, no disrespect toward Dr Golomb. She deserves kudos for being willing to tackle this subject which will no doubt make her very unpopular among the cult of Scientism as practiced by conventional medical researchers today.)

How to improve your clinical trial results

For improved results, try to use the most harmful placebo substances you can. For example, in real clinical trials involving AIDS patients -- who tend to be lactose intolerant -- researchers have used pills made of, guess what? Lactose!

That's sort of like running a clinical trial on a cure for heroin addiction and using heroin as the placebo, isn't it? Gee, somehow our drug worked "better than placebo." Funny how that works, isn't it?

And if you still don't get the results you want, just start inventing your own data like other clinical trial researchers do. Remember Dr Scott Reuben? This highly-respected clinical trial researcher faked at least twenty-one clinical trials for Big Pharma (http://www.naturalnews.com/028194_S...). His fraudulent clinical trials are still being cited to sell prescription medications!

Heck, who needs placebo when you can just invent the data?

Come to think of it, who needs science when you can just use anything you want and call it placebo in the first place?

Conventional medicine operates clinical trials in the same way that banks and securities firms handle mortgage documents. They all just sort of make things up as they go along, committing felony crimes on a daily basis while hoping nobody notices. On that note, check out this amazing story by Greg Hunter called The Perfect No-Prosecution Crime (http://usawatchdog.com/the-perfect-...).

Where on the skeptics when it comes to Big Pharma science fraud?

Seriously, you just gotta love the state of medical science today. I've never watched a more hilarious group of nincompoops reassure each other that they're all so scientific while practicing the most quack-ridden chicanery imaginable. The stuff being pulled off today in the name of Big Pharma's clinical trials makes psychic detectives and tarot card readers look downright scientifically gifted by comparison.

It really makes you wonder about so-called "skeptics," doesn't it? If they're skeptical of homeopathy, tarot cards, psychic mediums and people who claim they can levitate, I can at least understand the urge to ask tough questions about all these things. I ask tough questions, too, especially when people tell me they've seen ghosts or spirits coming back from the dead or other unexplained phenomena. (And I've already publicly denounced so-called "psychic surgery" which it quite obviously little more than sleight-of-hand trickery combined with animal blood.)

But most conventional skeptics never step out of bounds of their "safety zone" of popular topics for which skepticism may be safely expressed. They won't dare ask skeptical questions about the quack science backing the pharmaceutical industry, for example. Nor will they ask tough questions about vaccines, or mammography, or chemotherapy. And you'd be hard pressed to find anything more steeped in outright fraudulent quackery than the pharmaceutical industry as operated today (and the cancer branch of it in particular).

That's why I'm skeptical about the skeptics. If a skeptic doesn't question the loosey goosey pseudoscience practiced by Big Pharma, then they really have no credibility as a skeptic. You can't be selectively skeptical about some things but then a fall-for-anything fool on other scams just because they're backed by drug companies.

But getting back to this study in particular...

Abstract of the study

Here's some of the text from the abstract of this study published in the Annals of Internal Medicine (http://www.annals.org/content/153/8...)

What's in Placebos: Who Knows? Analysis of Randomized, Controlled Trials

1. Beatrice A. Golomb, MD, PhD;
2. Laura C. Erickson, BS;
3. Sabrina Koperski, BS;
4. Deanna Sack, BS;
5. Murray Enkin, MD; and
6. Jeremy Howick, PhD

Background: No regulations govern placebo composition. The composition of placebos can influence trial outcomes and merits reporting.

Purpose: To assess how often investigators specify the composition of placebos in randomized, placebo-controlled trials.

Data Sources: 4 English-language general and internal medicine journals with high impact factors.

Study Selection: 3 reviewers screened titles and abstracts of the journals to identify randomized, placebo-controlled trials published from January 2008 to December 2009.

Data Extraction: Reviewers independently abstracted data from the introduction and methods sections of identified articles, recording treatment type (pill, injection, or other) and whether placebo composition was stated. Discrepancies were resolved by consensus.

Data Synthesis: Most studies did not disclose the composition of the study placebo. Disclosure was less common for pills than for injections and other treatments (8.2% vs. 26.7%; P = 0.002).

Limitation: Journals with high impact factors may not be representative.

Conclusion: Placebos were seldom described in randomized, controlled trials of pills or capsules. Because the nature of the placebo can influence trial outcomes, placebo formulation should be disclosed in reports of placebo-controlled trials.

Primary Funding Source: University of California Foundation Fund 3929 -- Medical Reasoning.


Labels: , , , , , , , , ,

Monday, April 12, 2010

Feds found Pfizer too big to nail

CNN Special Investigations Unit
By Drew Griffin and Andy Segal,
April 2, 2010


CNN's Special Investigations Unit reveals internal company documents on Bextra and Pfizer's health care fraud. Watch at 3 p.m. ET Saturday on CNN.

VIEW VIDEO OF THIS STORY HERE:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ehUWAsSvFw

(CNN) -- Imagine being charged with a crime, but an imaginary friend takes the rap for you.

That is essentially what happened when Pfizer, the world's largest pharmaceutical company, was caught illegally marketing Bextra, a painkiller that was taken off the market in 2005 because of safety concerns.

When the criminal case was announced last fall, federal officials touted their prosecution as a model for tough, effective enforcement. "It sends a clear message" to the pharmaceutical industry, said Kevin Perkins, assistant director of the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division.

But beyond the fanfare, a CNN Special Investigation found another story, one that officials downplayed when they declared victory. It's a story about the power major pharmaceutical companies have even when they break the laws intended to protect patients.

Big plans for Bextra

The story begins in 2001, when Bextra was about to hit the market. The drug was part of a revolutionary class of painkillers known as Cox-2 inhibitors that were supposed to be safer than generic drugs, but at 20 times the price of ibuprofen.

Pfizer and its marketing partner, Pharmacia, planned to sell Bextra as a treatment for acute pain, the kind you have after surgery.

But in November 2001, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration said Bextra was not safe for patients at high risk of heart attacks and strokes.

The FDA approved Bextra only for arthritis and menstrual cramps. It rejected the drug in higher doses for acute, surgical pain.

Promoting drugs for unapproved uses can put patients at risk by circumventing the FDA's judgment over which products are safe and effective. For that reason, "off-label" promotion is against the law.

But with billions of dollars of profits at stake, marketing and sales managers across the country nonetheless targeted anesthesiologists, foot surgeons, orthopedic surgeons and oral surgeons. "Anyone that use[d] a scalpel for a living," one district manager advised in a document prosecutors would later cite.

A manager in Florida e-mailed his sales reps a scripted sales pitch that claimed -- falsely -- that the FDA had given Bextra "a clean bill of health" all the way up to a 40 mg dose, which is twice what the FDA actually said was safe.

Doctors as pitchmen

Internal company documents show that Pfizer and Pharmacia (which Pfizer later bought) used a multimillion-dollar medical education budget to pay hundreds of doctors as speakers and consultants to tout Bextra.

Pfizer said in court that "the company's intent was pure": to foster a legal exchange of scientific information among doctors.

But an internal marketing plan called for training physicians "to serve as public relations spokespeople."

According to Lewis Morris, chief counsel to the inspector general at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "They pushed the envelope so far past any reasonable interpretation of the law that it's simply outrageous."

Pfizer's chief compliance officer, Doug Lanker, said that "in a large sales force, successful sales techniques spread quickly," but that top Pfizer executives were not aware of the "significant mis-promotion issue with Bextra" until federal prosecutors began to show them the evidence.

By April 2005, when Bextra was taken off the market, more than half of its $1.7 billion in profits had come from prescriptions written for uses the FDA had rejected.

Too big to nail

But when it came to prosecuting Pfizer for its fraudulent marketing, the pharmaceutical giant had a trump card: Just as the giant banks on Wall Street were deemed too big to fail, Pfizer was considered too big to nail.

Why? Because any company convicted of a major health care fraud is automatically excluded from Medicare and Medicaid. Convicting Pfizer on Bextra would prevent the company from billing federal health programs for any of its products. It would be a corporate death sentence.

Prosecutors said that excluding Pfizer would most likely lead to Pfizer's collapse, with collateral consequences: disrupting the flow of Pfizer products to Medicare and Medicaid recipients, causing the loss of jobs including those of Pfizer employees who were not involved in the fraud, and causing significant losses for Pfizer shareholders.

"We have to ask whether by excluding the company [from Medicare and Medicaid], are we harming our patients," said Lewis Morris of the Department of Health and Human Services.

So Pfizer and the feds cut a deal. Instead of charging Pfizer with a crime, prosecutors would charge a Pfizer subsidiary, Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. Inc.

The CNN Special Investigation found that the subsidiary is nothing more than a shell company whose only function is to plead guilty.

According to court documents, Pfizer Inc. owns (a) Pharmacia Corp., which owns (b) Pharmacia & Upjohn LLC, which owns (c) Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. LLC, which in turn owns (d) Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. Inc. It is the great-great-grandson of the parent company.

Public records show that the subsidiary was incorporated in Delaware on March 27, 2007, the same day Pfizer lawyers and federal prosecutors agreed that the company would plead guilty in a kickback case against a company Pfizer had acquired a few years earlier.

As a result, Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. Inc., the subsidiary, was excluded from Medicare without ever having sold so much as a single pill. And Pfizer was free to sell its products to federally funded health programs.

An imaginary friend

Two years later, with Bextra, the shell company once again pleaded guilty. It was, in effect, Pfizer's imaginary friend stepping up to take the rap.

"It is true that if a company is created to take a criminal plea, but it's just a shell, the impact of an exclusion is minimal or nonexistent," Morris said.

Prosecutors say there was no viable alternative.

"If we prosecute Pfizer, they get excluded," said Mike Loucks, the federal prosecutor who oversaw the investigation. "A lot of the people who work for the company who haven't engaged in criminal activity would get hurt."

Did the punishment fit the crime? Pfizer says yes.

It paid nearly $1.2 billion in a criminal fine for Bextra, the largest fine the federal government has ever collected.

It paid a billion dollars more to settle a batch of civil suits -- although it denied wrongdoing -- on allegations that it illegally promoted 12 other drugs.

In all, Pfizer lost the equivalent of three months' profit.

It maintained its ability to do business with the federal government.

Pfizer says it takes responsibility for the illegal promotion of Bextra. "I can tell you, unequivocally, that Pfizer perceived the Bextra matter as an incredibly serious one," said Doug Lankler, Pfizer's chief compliance officer.

To prevent it from happening again, Pfizer has set up what it calls "leading-edge" systems to spot signs of illegal promotion by closely monitoring sales reps and tracking prescription sales.

It's not entirely voluntary. Pfizer had to sign a corporate integrity agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services. For the next five years, it requires Pfizer to disclose future payments to doctors and top executives to sign off personally that the company is obeying the law.

Pfizer says the company has learned its lesson.

But after years of overseeing similar cases against other major drug companies, even Loucks, isn't sure $2 billion in penalties is a deterrent when the profits from illegal promotion can be so large.

"I worry that the money is so great," he said, that dealing with the Department of Justice may be "just of a cost of doing business."

Labels: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Fact-Checking the New Yorker

The real results from the STAR*D trial
Psychology Today
from Robert Whitaker Mad In America Blog

In the March 1 issue of the New Yorker, Louis Menand surveyed the topsy-turvy world of treatments for depression, writing in part of the conflicting evidence regarding the efficacy of antidepressants. The strongest evidence for the drugs, he suggested, came from the NIMH's STAR*D trial. Here's what he wrote:


Response to antidepressants is extremely variable. It can take several different prescriptions to find a medication that works. Measuring a single antidepressant against a placebo is not a test of the effectiveness of antidepressants as a category. And there is a well-known study, called the Sequence Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression, or STAR*D trial, in which patients were given a series of different antidepressants. Though only thirty-seven percent recovered on the first drug, another nineteen percent recovered on the second drug, six percent after the third, and five percent after the fourth-a sixty-seven-percent effectiveness rate for antidepressant medication, far better than the rate achieved by a placebo.

That statistic--that two-thirds of the patients eventually "recovered" in the STAR*D trial--has become an oft-cited one. The implication is that if depressed patients try a succession of antidepressants, they are likely to find one that "works" and keeps them well. Unfortunately, the results from the STAR*D trial do not support that belief.

Here's the data that was reported by lead investigator John Rush and several of his colleagues in a 2006 article titled: "Acute and longer-term outcomes in depressed outpatients requiring one or several treatment steps: A STAR*D report."

There were 3671 adults with major depression who entered the "first stage" of the study. Of that group, 1,346 patients (36.8%) saw their depressive symptoms remit. Of those who didn't remit, 1,439 entered the second stage of the study and switched to a new antidepressant (the rest of the non-remitters dropped out.) In this second stage, 439 remitted (30.6%). Only 390 non-remitted patients agreed to give a third antidepressant a try; 53 remitted in that stage (14%.) In stage four, 16 of 123 patients remitted (13%).

In sum, of the 3671 patients that entered the study, 1,854 remitted (50.5%). Yet, Rush and the other STAR*D investigators reported in their various articles that the "overall cumulative remission rate was 67%," which of course raises the question of where this number came from.

The higher remission rate was purely "theoretical." The researchers assumed that if those who dropped out during the various stages had instead stayed with the protocol all the way through stage four, they would have remitted at the same rate (in the various stages) as those who did stay in the study. This, of course, is a big assumption, and it also hides the fact that if this multiple drug-therapy strategy is employed in the real world, a significant percentage of patients won't stay with it.

This brings us to the second part of the STAR*D story: what percentage of the patients who saw their symptoms remit stayed well through a 12-month followup? In the New Yorker story--and this is how the data is usually presented to the public--the implication was that once a patient finds a drug that "works," he or she stays well. But this study didn't document any such long-term recovery.

According to the follow-up protocol, the remitted patients were supposed to make a call to an "interactive voice response system" monthly so that their depressive symptoms could be assessed. However, only 1,174 of the 1,854 remitted patients made at least one call to the interactive system. In other words, many remitted patients did not participate in the follow-up study, and even many of those who did only remained in it for a short time, rather than for a full year. During this incomplete followup, 37% of the 1,174 patients reported that they had relapsed.

In other words, of the 3,671 patients who entered the trial, only 737 individuals (20%) remitted and then reported, at some point during the 12-month followup, that they had stayed well. The remaining patients (80%) either never remitted, or dropped out at some point, or relapsed during the followup. Moreover, it's unclear from the published results how many of the 737 non-relapsed patients stayed in the followup study for a full year.

In short, the study data did not tell of a form of care that helps two-thirds of all patients recover and stay well for a longer period of time. The 67% recovery rate reported in the New Yorker, a figure that has been often cited to show that if patients are tried on multiple antidepressants they are very likely to find one that works for them, isn't a "real-world" number. It's a number that tells of a "theoretical" remission rate, and it hides the fact that many remitted patients then quickly relapse.

In his article, Louis Menand concluded that the STAR*D trial proved that antidepressants, as a class, have a much higher effectiveness rate than placebo. That claim raises a question to be explored in a follow-up post to this blog: What is the long-term recovery rate for unmedicated depression? Although there was no placebo group in the STAR*D study, in the past decade NIMH-funded investigators did conduct a study of the long-term course of untreated depression. Thus, we can compare the results from that study to see if STAR*D proved, as the New Yorker reported, that antidepressants, as a class, are much more effective than placebo in helping patients recover. Most readers, I believe, will find the results eye-opening.

Labels: , , , , , ,

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Glaxo to Shift Away from Antidepressant Research CEO admits antidepressant research only based on subjective mood surveys

Wall Street Journal
By Jeanne Whalen
February 5, 2010


GlaxoSmithKline PLC said it will stop research into new antidepressants and focus on diseases for which it believes it can develop more valuable drugs, a major shift for a company that developed some of the biggest-selling antidepressants of the past 20 years.

Profits at the U.K. drug giant, which posted a 66% increase in fourth-quarter earnings Thursday, were long fueled by the antidepressants Paxil and Wellbutrin, which at their peak generated billions of dollars a year in sales. Similar medicines, such as Eli Lilly & Co.’s Prozac and Pfizer Inc.’s Zoloft, also generated big sales for those companies.

However, low-cost generic copies have eroded demand for name-brand antidepressants, which accounted for just 2.3% of Glaxo’s total sales last year, down from 14% in 2002. Chief Executive Andrew Witty said Thursday that the company thinks further investment in the market wouldn’t be prudent.

Part of the reason is financial risk. Clinical trials of antidepressants are among the “most expensive and highest-risk” of all drug trials, Mr. Witty said, because companies often don’t know until the end of very large studies whether a drug works. It is also hard to prove that a depression drug is working, he said, because patient improvement is measured by subjective mood surveys, and not by the clear-cut blood tests and biological measures used in other diseases.

That’s a drawback in an era when insurers and other health-care payers want to see clear value for their money, Mr. Witty said.

Payers “want big benefits to make it worth their while to invest their resources,” he said, adding that Glaxo would scrap research into pain drugs for the same reasons, focusing instead on diseases including Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, multiple sclerosis and a clutch of rare diseases.

Labels: , , , , , , , , , ,

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses

Bloomberg News
November 9, 2009
By David Evans

Nov. 9 (Bloomberg) -- Prosecutor Michael Loucks remembers clearly when lawyers for Pfizer Inc., the world’s largest drug company, looked across the table and promised it wouldn’t break the law again.

It was January 2004, and the attorneys were negotiating in a conference room on the ninth floor of the federal courthouse in Boston, where Loucks was head of the health-care fraud unit of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. One of Pfizer’s units had been pushing doctors to prescribe an epilepsy drug called Neurontin for uses the Food and Drug Administration had never approved.

In the agreement the lawyers eventually hammered out, the Pfizer unit, Warner-Lambert, pleaded guilty to two felony counts of marketing a drug for unapproved uses.

New York-based Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million in criminal fines and civil penalties, and the company’s lawyers assured Loucks and three other prosecutors that Pfizer and its units would stop promoting drugs for unauthorized purposes.

What Loucks, who’s now acting U.S. attorney in Boston, didn’t know until years later was that Pfizer managers were breaking that pledge not to practice so-called off-label marketing even before the ink was dry on their plea.

On the morning of Sept. 2, 2009, another Pfizer unit, Pharmacia & Upjohn, agreed to plead guilty to the same crime. This time, Pfizer executives had been instructing more than 100 salespeople to promote Bextra, a drug approved only for the relief of arthritis and menstrual discomfort, for treatment of acute pains of all kinds.

Record High Fine

For this new felony, Pfizer paid the largest criminal fine in U.S. history: $1.19 billion. On the same day, it paid $1 billion to settle civil cases involving the off-label promotion of Bextra and three other drugs with the U.S. and 49 states.

“At the very same time Pfizer was in our office negotiating and resolving the allegations of criminal conduct in 2004, Pfizer was itself in its other operations violating those very same laws,” Loucks, 54, says. “They’ve repeatedly marketed drugs for things they knew they couldn’t demonstrate efficacy for. That’s clearly criminal.”

The penalties Pfizer paid this year for promoting Bextra off-label were the latest chapter in the drug’s benighted history. The FDA found Bextra to be so dangerous that Pfizer took it off the market for all uses in 2005.

Across the U.S., pharmaceutical companies have been pleading guilty to criminal charges or paying penalties in civil cases when the U.S. Department of Justice finds that they deceptively marketed drugs for unapproved uses, putting millions of people at risk of chest infections, heart attacks, suicidal impulses or death.

$7 Billion in Penalties

Since May 2004, Pfizer, Eli Lilly & Co., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. and four other drug companies have paid a total of $7 billion in fines and penalties. Six of the companies admitted in court that they marketed medicines for unapproved uses.

In September 2007, New York-based Bristol-Myers paid $515 million -- without admitting or denying wrongdoing -- to federal and state governments in a civil lawsuit brought by the Justice Department. The six other companies pleaded guilty in criminal cases.

In January 2009, Indianapolis-based Lilly, the largest U.S. psychiatric drug maker, pleaded guilty and paid $1.42 billion in fines and penalties to settle charges that it had for at least four years illegally marketed Zyprexa, a drug approved for the treatment of schizophrenia, as a remedy for dementia in elderly patients.

In five company-sponsored clinical trials, 31 people out of 1,184 participants died after taking the drug for dementia -- twice the death rate for those taking a placebo. Those findings were reported in an October 2005 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association.

‘Don’t Respect the Law’

“Marketing departments of many drug companies don’t respect any boundaries of professionalism or the law,” says Jerry Avorn, a professor at Harvard Medical School in Boston and author of “Powerful Medicines: The Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Prescription Drugs” (Random House, 2004). “The Pfizer and Lilly cases involved the illegal promotion of drugs that have been shown to cause substantial harm and death to patients.”

The widespread off-label promotion of drugs is yet another manifestation of a health-care system that has become dysfunctional.

“It’s an unbearable cost to a system that’s going broke,” says Avorn, who heads the pharmacology economics unit of Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. “We can’t even afford to pay for effective, safe therapies.”

10 Million Prescriptions

About 15 percent of all drug sales in the U.S. are for unapproved uses without adequate evidence the medicines work, according to a study by Randall Stafford, a medical professor at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California.

He estimates that doctors write more than 10 million such prescriptions each year.

As large as the penalties are for drug companies caught breaking the off-label law, the fines are tiny compared with the firms’ annual revenues.

The $2.3 billion in fines and penalties Pfizer paid for marketing Bextra and three other drugs cited in the Sept. 2 plea agreement for off-label uses amount to just 14 percent of its $16.8 billion in revenue from selling those medicines from 2001 to 2008.

The total of $2.75 billion Pfizer has paid in off-label penalties since 2004 is a little more than 1 percent of the company’s revenue of $245 billion from 2004 to 2008.

$36 Billion in Revenue

Lilly already had a criminal conviction for misbranding a drug when it broke the law again in promoting schizophrenia drug Zyprexa for off-label uses starting in 1999. The medication provided Lilly with $36 billion in revenue from 2000 to 2008.

That’s more than 25 times as much as the total penalties Lilly paid in January.

Companies regard the risk of multimillion-dollar penalties as just another cost of doing business, says Lon Schneider, a professor at the University of Southern California’s Keck School of Medicine in Los Angeles.

In 2006, he led a study for the National Institute of Mental Health of off-label use of drugs, including Zyprexa, for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease.

“There’s an unwritten business plan,” he says. “They’re drivers that knowingly speed. If stopped, they pay the fine, and then they do it again.”

Shareholders Unmoved

Schneider has been paid both by Lilly as a consultant and by plaintiffs suing the company.

Big Pharma’s off-label transgressions didn’t trigger a rush for the doors by shareholders. From Jan. 26, when Pfizer announced that it would pay billions in penalties, to Oct. 12, Pfizer’s share price increased 9.3 percent, just shy of the 11.2 percent rise in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Health Care Index.

From Oct. 21, 2008, when Lilly said it would pay its penalties, to Oct. 12, the company’s stock value went up 0.6 percent; the S&P index gained 6.9 percent in that time.

In pushing off-label use of drugs, companies find ready and willing partners in physicians. Under the fragmented system of medical regulation in the U.S., it’s legal for doctors to prescribe FDA-approved drugs for any use.

The FDA has no authority over doctors, only over drug companies, regarding off-label practices. It’s up to the 50 states to oversee physicians.

“I think the physician community has to take some ownership responsibility and do their own due diligence beyond the sales and marketing person,” says Boston’s former U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan.

Off-Label Benefits

Loucks says prosecutors realize that patients can benefit when doctors use drugs for off-label purposes based on science and not on false marketing claims.

Doctors generally don’t tell people that they’re prescribing drugs pitched to them by pharmaceutical salespeople for unapproved treatments, says Peter Lurie, deputy medical director of Public Citizen, a Washington-based public interest group.

Most physicians don’t keep track of FDA-approved uses of drugs, says Lurie, a physician who has published articles in “The Lancet” and the “Journal of the American Medical Association.”

“The great majority of doctors have no idea; they don’t even understand the distinction between on- and off-labeling,” Lurie says.

Pharmaceutical companies have showered doctors with cash to persuade them to use drugs off-label, according to their guilty pleas.

‘Buying Access’

Pfizer’s marketing program offered doctors up to $1,000 a day to allow a Pfizer salesperson to spend time with the physician and his patients, according to a whistle-blower lawsuit filed by John Kopchinski, who worked as a salesman at Pfizer from 1992 to 2003.

“By ‘pairing up’ with a physician, the sales representative was able to promote over a period of many hours, without the usual problems of gaining access to prescribing physicians,” Kopchinski says. “In essence, this amounted to Pfizer buying access to physicians.”

Pfizer spokesman Chris Loder says the company stopped what it calls “mentorships” in 2005. He says Pfizer paid doctors $250 per visit.

It used to be legal for companies to promote drugs for any use in the U.S. Congress banned the practice in 1962. The catalyst was Thalidomide, a morning sickness drug taken by pregnant women outside the U.S. that caused severe birth defects.

Recouping Investments

The 1962 law required pharmaceutical companies to prove their drugs were safe and effective for specific uses. Before that, a drug company could market an approved medicine for any illness.

If the law is clear, why do drug companies keep breaking it? The answer lies in economics. Pharmaceutical companies spend about $1 billion to develop and test a new drug. To recoup their investment, the companies want doctors to prescribe their drugs as widely as possible.

Pfizer’s Neurontin is a case in point. The FDA approved the drug as a supplemental medication in treating epilepsy in 1993. Pfizer took in $2.27 billion from sales of Neurontin in 2002. A full 94 percent -- $2.12 billion -- of that revenue came from off-label use, according to the prosecutors’ 2004 Pfizer sentencing memo.

Pfizer, which bought Wyeth on Oct. 15 for $68 billion, put itself at the center of illegal off-label drug marketing with an acquisition frenzy a decade earlier. From 1995 to 2005, Pfizer purchased more than 20 companies.

Guilty Pleas

Since 2004, companies that are now Pfizer divisions have pleaded guilty to off-label marketing of two drugs. Pfizer continued off-label promotions for these medications after buying the firms, according to Pfizer’s Sept. 2 guilty plea and FDA correspondence with Pfizer.

Pfizer first stepped into an off-label scheme in 1999, when it offered to buy Morris Plains, New Jersey-based Warner-Lambert Co. Prosecutors charged that Warner-Lambert marketed Neurontin off-label between 1995 and 1999.

Warner-Lambert admitted doing so for one year in a May 2004 guilty plea for which Pfizer paid $430 million in fines and penalties.

Neurontin, which was invented by Warner-Lambert, was first tested in humans in 1987. When the FDA approved it in 1993 to be used only along with other epilepsy drugs, the agency wrote that a side effect of the drug can be that it induces depression and suicidal thoughts in patients.

Whistle-Blower

Much of what prosecutors learned about Warner-Lambert’s marketing of Neurontin comes from a former employee.

David Franklin, who holds a Ph.D. in microbiology from the University of Rhode Island, left his job as a pediatric researcher at Harvard University’s Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in 1996 to work for the Parke-Davis unit of Warner-Lambert in Boston.

He says he hoped the salary boost -- to $55,000 annually from $18,000 -- would help him pay off student loans and better support his family.

Franklin’s title at Warner-Lambert was medical liaison. He says he soon realized his new employer viewed his doctorate as a badge that would allow him to strike up conversations with physicians.

Franklin, 48, says his job involved more salesmanship than science. He told doctors that Neurontin was the best drug for a dozen off-label uses, including pain relief, bipolar disease and depression.

‘What I Did Was Wrong’

“Technically, I had responsibility for answering physician questions about all of Parke-Davis’s drugs,” Franklin says. “In practice, my real job was to promote Neurontin for off- label indications heavily -- to the exclusion of just about everything else.”

Franklin, whose wife is a lawyer, says he knew such uses of the drug had no scientific support for effectiveness and safety.

“I was actually undermining their ability to fulfill the Hippocratic oath,” Franklin says, referring to a physician’s pledge to “first, do no harm.”

Franklin says he was horrified when he learned from a doctor that a child had a behavioral outburst at school for the first time after taking Neurontin.

“Don’t we have an obligation to tell physicians about this?” Franklin says he asked his manager, Phil Magistro. His boss tried to reassure him, Franklin says.

‘Total Disregard’

“‘Don’t worry about this stuff,’” he says Magistro told him. “‘It can never get back to us.’”

Franklin was stunned.

“I realized at that moment, looking into his eyes, that there was an absolute total disregard for the patient,” he says.

Magistro, who now works at drug marketing adviser Atom Strategic Consulting LLC in Randolph, New Jersey, didn’t return calls seeking comment.

Franklin saved phone messages from Magistro to his sales team urging them to market Neurontin for off-label uses, including pain relief. During one such call, on May 23, 1996, at 5:48 p.m. in Boston, Magistro told his staff, “You’re supposed to be pushing on Neurontin,” according to a transcript of the tape filed in federal court.

“When we get out there, we want to kick some ass. We want to sell Neurontin on pain,” Magistro said. “All right?”

Quit the Job

After working for Warner-Lambert for three months, Franklin grew concerned about his own liability. He quit the job and talked with Boston attorney Thomas Greene, who helped him file a lawsuit against the company.

Franklin acted as a whistle-blower, suing on behalf of taxpayers to recover money the government paid for illegally promoted drugs. Under federal and state whistle-blower statutes, he stood to collect as much as 30 percent of any settlement the company made with the government.

Franklin had to wait four years -- until 2000 -- before the Justice Department began a criminal investigation. In November 1999, Pfizer made its public offer to buy Warner-Lambert. In January 2000, a federal grand jury in Boston issued subpoenas to Warner-Lambert employees to testify about the marketing of Neurontin.

That March, Warner-Lambert’s annual report disclosed that prosecutors were building a criminal case. Undeterred, Pfizer bought Warner-Lambert in June for $87 billion. It was the third- largest merger in U.S. history.

‘Misleading and in Violation’

A year after the acquisition, the FDA discovered that Neurontin was still being marketed off-label. In a letter to the company on June 29, 2001, the agency wrote that Pfizer’s promotion of the drug “is misleading and in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.”

The agency asked Pfizer to stop such promotions of Neurontin. The FDA said Pfizer had distributed brochures -- known as “slim jims” because they’re small enough to put in a jacket pocket -- improperly claiming that the drug could improve energy levels and memory.

“Immediately discontinue the use of this slim jim and any other promotional material or practices with the same or similar messages,” the FDA wrote.

Pfizer marketed Neurontin off-label after receiving that letter, agency records show. For 2001, Pfizer reported revenue of $1.75 billion from Neurontin sales, making it the company’s fourth-largest-selling drug that year, ahead of impotence pill Viagra, which Neurontin topped for four years.

Marketing Violated Rules

As Neurontin sales soared to $2.27 billion in 2002, the FDA found that Pfizer was improperly claiming that the drug was useful for a broader range of brain disorders than scientific evidence had established.

The agency sent a letter dated July 1, 2002, that said the company’s marketing practices were in violation of FDA rules. It asked Pfizer to stop using misleading promotions. Pfizer reported $2.7 billion in revenue from Neurontin in 2003. Overall, the drug has provided Pfizer with $12 billion in revenue.

In a response to Bloomberg News, Pfizer spokesman Chris Loder said, “Regarding the 2001 and 2002 FDA letters, we do not believe that they were suggestive of any continuing off-label promotion.”

For blowing the whistle on his employer, Franklin collected $24.6 million under the False Claims Act.

Prosecutors Loucks and Sullivan got involved in the case after Franklin filed his suit, relying on information from Franklin and their own investigation. Before 2004, prosecutions for off-label marketing were rare.

‘Everybody Does It’

“Until a couple of these cases became public, companies were probably saying, ‘Everybody does it this way,’” Sullivan says.

Loucks had a track record in off-label prosecutions. He gave up private practice at Choate Hall & Stewart LLP in Boston in 1985 to join the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

In 1994, he negotiated a $61 million settlement with Murray Hill, New Jersey-based C.R. Bard Inc., which pleaded guilty to promoting off-label use of a heart catheter that led to patient deaths.

In 2002, he co-authored, with Carol Lam, “Prosecuting and Defending Health Care Fraud Cases” (BNA Books).

In the January 2004 settlement negotiations with Loucks, Sullivan and two other prosecutors, Pfizer’s lawyers assured the U.S. Attorney’s Office that the company wouldn’t market drugs off-label.

‘Those Promises’

“They asserted that the company understood the rules and had taken steps to assure corporate compliance with the law,” Loucks says. “We remember those promises.”

What Pfizer’s lawyers didn’t tell the prosecutors was that Pfizer was at that moment running an off-label marketing promotion using more than 100 of its salespeople. They were pitching Bextra, a Pfizer sales manager admitted when she pleaded guilty to misbranding a drug on March 30, 2009.

Jeff Kindler, who became Pfizer’s general counsel in 2002, supervised the lawyers who made the promises to prosecutors. By 2004, Kindler increased the compliance budget 12-fold. He became chief executive officer in 2006. In Pfizer’s ethics guide, he says stories about misbehaving companies and executives abound.

“Pfizer truly stands apart,” he says. “I am proud of our record.” On Oct. 1, Kindler was elected to the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Kindler declined to comment.

Peapack, New Jersey-based Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc. developed Bextra, which was approved by the FDA only for the treatment of arthritis and menstrual discomfort in 2001.

Sales Manager Pleads Guilty

P&U and Pfizer had by then already crafted a joint marketing agreement to sell the drug. In November 2001, Mary Holloway, a Pfizer regional manager for the Northeastern U.S., began illegally training and directing her sales team to market Bextra for the relief of acute pain, Holloway admitted in a March 2009 guilty plea.

On Dec. 4, 2001, Pfizer executives sent Holloway a copy of a nonpublic letter from the FDA to the company. The agency had denied Pfizer’s application to market Bextra for acute pain. Clinical trials had shown Bextra could cause heart damage and death.

Pfizer bought Pharmacia & Upjohn in April 2003. From 2001 to the end of 2003, P&U, first as an independent company and then as a unit of Pfizer, paid physicians more than $5 million in cash to lure them to resorts, where salespeople illegally pitched off-label uses for Bextra, P&U admitted in its Sept. 2 guilty plea.

‘Golf, Massages’

“Pharmacia paid targeted physicians both airfare and two to three days’ accommodations at lavish resorts in the Bahamas, Virgin Islands and across the United States and further entertained these physicians with golf, massages and other recreation activities,” according to prosecutors’ findings.

In her guilty plea, Holloway said her team had solicited hospitals to create protocols to buy Bextra for the unapproved purpose of acute pain relief. Her representatives didn’t mention the increased risk of heart attacks in their marketing.

They told doctors that side effects were no worse than those of a sugar pill, Holloway admitted in her guilty plea.

In 2003, Holloway reported her unit’s off-label promotions of Bextra up the corporate ladder at Pfizer, according to a pre- sentencing memo to the judge written by Robert Ullmann, Holloway’s attorney. Top managers didn’t attempt to halt the illegal conduct, the memo said.

“Corporate tracked this information, and at no time did it inform Ms. Holloway that any of the reported protocols were inappropriate,” he wrote. “Instead, the instruction was to get more protocols.”

Blockbuster Status

By the end of 2004, Bextra reached blockbuster status, with annual sales of $1.29 billion. Holloway promoted Bextra until the FDA asked Pfizer in April 2005 to pull it from the market for all uses, evidence in her case shows.

The agency concluded that the drug increased the risk of heart attacks, chest infections and strokes in cardiac surgery patients. In June 2009, Holloway, 47, was sentenced to two years on probation and fined $75,000. She didn’t return phone calls seeking comment.

Ronald Rainero, a Pfizer district sales manager and employee for more than 20 years, says he was responsible for promoting Bextra in New York from 2001 to 2005. In September 2007, Rainero, 47, began cooperating with federal prosecutors on the Bextra case.

Hotel Meetings

He says he met monthly with his fellow managers at a Hilton hotel in Staten Island, New York, to discuss sales methods of promoting Bextra off-label. As a whistle-blower, Rainero was awarded $9.3 million as part of the September settlement.

In the same time period that Pfizer was marketing Bextra off-label, the company’s sales force was promoting another drug, Zyvox, improperly, Pfizer admitted at the time of its September plea agreement.

Zyvox was approved in 2000 by the FDA for treating MRSA- caused pneumonia and skin infections. Raniero told federal prosecutors that Pfizer began the Zyvox campaign in 2001. The company admitted to falsely claiming that the drug was better than other medications for treating MRSA pneumonia.

Pfizer told doctors to use Zyvox rather than vancomycin, a generic antibiotic that cost $18 a day. Pfizer sold Zyvox for about $150 a day. A table on page 30 of a 35-page fact book produced by Pfizer for Zyvox says the drug is less effective than vancomycin for MRSA pneumonia.

‘Misleading Promotion’

On July 20, 2005, the FDA sent a letter to Hank McKinnell, then Pfizer’s CEO, saying, “Your misleading promotion of Zyvox, and in particular your unsubstantiated implied claims regarding its superiority to vancomycin, poses serious health and safety concerns.”

The agency ordered the company to stop the promotion. In response, Pfizer told the FDA it would stop saying Zyvox was more effective against MRSA pneumonia than vancomycin.

Despite its 2005 pledge to the FDA, Pfizer continued to tell hospitals and doctors that Zyvox would save more lives than vancomycin, the company admitted in the September settlement.

By 2007, the criminal and civil cases against Pfizer, its employees and its subsidiaries had started to mount. The tally of drugs cited by federal prosecutors for off-label promotion reached six by 2009. In April 2007, P&U pleaded guilty to a felony charge of offering a $12 million kickback to a pharmacy benefit manager.

$2.2 Billion in Penalties

Pfizer paid a criminal fine of $19.7 million. Thomas Farina, a Pfizer district sales manager, was convicted in federal court in March 2009 for destroying records during the Bextra investigation. Farina, 42, was sentenced to three years on probation, including six months of home confinement. He didn’t return calls seeking comment.

Pfizer itself was called to account on Sept. 2, when it agreed to pay the $2.2 billion in fines and penalties. P&U pleaded guilty to a felony charge of misbranding Bextra with the intent to defraud. After the settlement, Pfizer general counsel Amy Schulman said the company had learned its lesson.

“We regret certain actions we’ve taken in the past,” she said. “Corporate integrity is an absolute priority for Pfizer.”

One reason drug companies keep breaking the law may be because prosecutors and judges have been unwilling to use the ultimate sanction -- a felony conviction that would render a company’s drugs ineligible for reimbursement by state health programs and federal Medicare.

“It’s potentially a death sentence for a drug company,” prosecutor Sullivan says.

Fig Leaf

A legal fig leaf allows a parent company to continue to participate in government programs even after its subsidiary has pleaded guilty.

Pfizer maintains its good standing with such agencies because its subsidiaries, Warner-Lambert and P&U, and not the corporation itself, entered the guilty pleas to felony charges.

A felony conviction of a pharmaceutical giant could lead to disaster for shareholders, Loucks says, adding that’s a step that may have to be taken for repeat offenders.

“I think it’s something the trigger will get pulled on,” he says from his ninth-floor office in the federal courthouse, with a sweeping view of Boston Harbor. “It’s just a question of when.”

At Pfizer’s Pharmacia sentencing on Oct. 16., U.S. District Court Judge Douglas Woodlock said companies don’t appear to take the law seriously.

“It has become something of a cost of doing business for some of these corporations, to shed their skin like certain animals and leave the skin and move on,” he said.

Eli Lilly

Lilly’s rap sheet goes back to 1985. That’s when the company pleaded guilty to 25 federal misdemeanor charges related to its misbranding of Oraflex, an arthritis drug.

Lilly stopped selling the drug four months after U.S. sales began in 1982, following the company’s failure to tell the FDA about illnesses and deaths tied to the medication. Lilly paid a $25,000 fine.

Twenty years later, in 2005, Lilly paid $36 million in a guilty plea to one federal misdemeanor for off-label marketing of Evista, a drug the FDA had approved for bone strengthening.

In 1997, the agency had rejected Lilly’s application to market the drug to reduce the risk of breast cancer. Yet beginning the next year, Lilly adopted an Evista marketing plan that included a seminar with doctors designed to appeal to women’s breast cancer concerns, Lilly admitted in its 2005 guilty plea.

In 2007, the FDA approved Evista for preventing breast cancer in two limited groups.

Back in Court

In January 2009, Lilly was back in federal court. Prosecutors in Philadelphia accused the company of earning hundreds of millions of dollars by illegally promoting its schizophrenia drug Zyprexa for the unapproved treatment of dementia from 1999 to at least 2003.

In 2001, Lilly’s senior management decided not to seek FDA approval for Zyprexa to treat dementia because of what they viewed as mixed results in clinical trials and safety risks, according to admissions by Lilly in its 2009 guilty plea. In its marketing, Lilly promoted the drug as effective.

Zyprexa has been Lilly’s best-selling drug for the past decade.

“Eli Lilly undertook this illegal off-label promotion for its own financial gain despite the potential risk to patients’ health and lives,” prosecutors wrote in their sentencing memo.

Lilly Chairman and CEO John Lechleiter said after the settlement that the company was devoted to acting responsibly.

‘Deeply Regret’

“We deeply regret the past actions covered by the misdemeanor plea,” he said. “Doing the right thing is nonnegotiable at Lilly.”

In a written response to questions from Bloomberg News, Lilly said, “Lilly entered into a very narrow guilty plea. Even though the company disagrees with and does not admit to the allegations, Lilly agreed to settle the dispute.”

Lilly paid $1.42 billion for a fine and penalties in the January settlement with federal and state governments. That included the largest criminal fine in U.S. history -- until Pfizer pleaded guilty in September.

The Justice Department could have charged Lilly with a felony. Prosecutors decided that it wouldn’t be fair to innocent Lilly employees, shareholders and pensioners to potentially shut down the company, according to the sentencing memo.

‘All the Factors’

“The government considered all the factors in its decision,” prosecutors wrote. “Those factors included other persons not proven personally culpable.”

Federal regulators have detected a similar pattern of dishonesty by other pharmaceutical firms. Schering-Plough Corp. drug salesmen pitched off-label uses of a cancer drug called Temodar at the American Society of Clinical Oncology’s annual conference in San Francisco in May 2001.

Schering-Plough representatives said Temodar compared favorably to a placebo in clinical trials for the off-label uses and was approved by the FDA for first-line use in treating brain tumors.

An FDA employee attending the conference took note. The next month, the FDA accused Schering of lying.

There had been no such clinical trials and the agency had not approved Temodar as the salespeople had claimed, the FDA said in a June 28, 2001, letter to Mary Jane Nehring, Schering’s senior director of marketed products. The agency ordered the company to immediately cease illegal promotion of Temodar.

Kenilworth, New Jersey-based Schering-Plough was quick to respond. On July 12, 2001, it wrote back to the FDA, assuring regulators that the San Francisco activity was an isolated incident.

‘Certainly Inconsistent’

“It was certainly inconsistent with the direction provided by the home office,” the drug company wrote, according to prosecutor’s records.

The FDA told Schering-Plough three weeks later that it had closed its investigation.

Schering-Plough didn’t stop pitching the drug for unapproved uses. At the direction of top management, Schering ordered widespread off-label marketing of Temodar and Intron A, another cancer drug, until December 2003, the company admitted in an August 2006 guilty plea.

Schering, which agreed in March to be acquired by Merck & Co., earned a pre-tax profit of $124.2 million from the illegal sales after promising the FDA in 2001 it would stop marketing for off-label uses, the company admitted.

Schering-Plough pleaded guilty in August 2006 to conspiring to make false statements to the FDA. The company agreed to pay $435 million to settle the case.

‘Upsetting to Me’

U.S. District Court Judge Patti Saris, who had presided over the Neurontin whistle-blower case before the Pfizer probe, accepted Schering’s plea in her Boston courtroom in January 2007. She expressed dismay with the drug industry.

“It’s been upsetting to me how many of the big pharmaceutical companies have engaged in what I view as clearly illegal behavior in terms of off-label marketing,” she said. “It almost seems as if the pharmaceutical companies said ‘Yeah, yeah, yeah’ to the FDA and then went and did it anyway.”

Brent Saunders, a Schering-Plough senior vice president, said after the settlement that his company had made great progress in putting integrity at the center of its work.

“With this agreement, we are putting issues from the past behind us,” he said. Schering declined to comment further.

As prosecutors continue to uncover patterns of deceit in off-label marketing by pharmaceutical companies, millions of patients across the nation remain in the dark. Doctors often choose the medications based on dishonest marketing by drug company salesmen.

‘A Morass’

“It’s a morass of undifferentiated information out there,” Public Citizen’s Lurie says. “And the doctors, let alone patients, aren’t able to distinguish the good from the bad.”

One thing all people should do, Lurie says, is ask whether their prescriptions are for FDA-approved uses, and if not, whether strong evidence supports using the drug, particularly if it can be dangerous.

Loucks says that putting an end to the criminal off-label schemes by the pharmaceutical industry is more difficult. As drugmakers repeatedly plead guilty, they’ve shown they’re willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in fines as a cost of generating billions in revenue.

The best hope, Loucks says, is that drug companies actually honor the promises they keep making -- and keep breaking -- to obey the law of the land.

To contact the reporter on this story: David Evans in Los Angeles at davidevans@bloomberg.net

Labels: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Tuesday, September 22, 2009

Lilly Paid Doctors to Prescribe Zyprexa, Notes Show

Bloomberg News
By Margaret Cronin Fisk and Jef Feeley


Sept. 8 (Bloomberg) -- Eli Lilly & Co. paid doctors in South Carolina for participating in a speakers’ program in exchange for prescribing the antipsychotic Zyprexa, and used golf bets to get more patients on the drug, according to notes by sales representatives.

During a golf game, one doctor agreed to start new patients on Zyprexa for each time a sales representative parred, or put the ball in a hole within a predetermined number of strokes, according to the notes.

“I got four pars out of nine holes,” Lilly salesman Vince Sullivan said in a February 2002 note. “I said I wanted my four new patients.”

The notes were made public for the first time in a court hearing today in South Carolina in the state’s lawsuit against Lilly over Zyprexa marketing practices. State officials contend Indianapolis-based Lilly marketed the drug for unapproved uses. A trial is set to begin Sept. 14.

South Carolina wants to recoup $200 million it contends it wrongfully spent on Zyprexa prescriptions as a result of Lilly’s push to get doctors to use the medicine, approved only for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, for other ailments. The state also contends the drugmaker withheld information about Zyprexa’s side effects, such as weight gain.

“Call notes are jottings written by sales reps and most reps make hundreds of notes monthly. They are not literal recitations of interactions with physicians,” Marni Lemons, a Lilly spokeswoman, said in telephone interview.

‘Out Of Context’

Lemons said the state’s lawyers took the notes “out of context” and “not one physician employed by the state of South Carolina has testified Lilly promoted off-label to them.”

The notes became public at a hearing in Spartanburg, South Carolina, on Lilly’s motion to have the state’s case thrown out prior to trial.

The state also is seeking a $5,000 fine for each Zyprexa prescription dating back to 1997, according to court filings. That could result in billions of dollars in fines, South Carolina’s lawyers say.

Lilly resolved a marketing investigation over Zyprexa in January with the U.S. Justice Department, promising to pay $1.42 billion, including about $362 million to more than 30 states. South Carolina opted not to join that settlement.

Alaska Settlement

The only trial of a state’s lawsuit ended in March 2008 with an out-of-court settlement in which Lilly agreed to pay Alaska $15 million.

Zyprexa, part of a class of medications called atypical antipsychotics, has been linked to excessive weight gain and diabetes. The lawsuits also claim Lilly failed to properly warn of Zyprexa’s side effects.

Lilly officials have denied the drugmaker withheld information about Zyprexa’s side effects or improperly marketed the drug in South Carolina.

Lawyers for the state pointed to a sales note from Sullivan in which he tells another salesman to tie a doctor’s Zyprexa prescriptions to participation in a speakers’ program.

The company paid doctors and psychiatrists to address physician gatherings about the benefits of the antipsychotic. “If his numbers go up, maybe he can talk,” Sullivan said in the August 2001 note.

‘So Much Money’

A year later, Sullivan noted in sales records that he was pressing a doctor to write more Zyprexa prescriptions “because we’re paying him so much money” to participate in the speakers’ program, according to a call note made public today.

Lilly also offered other inducements to doctors who prescribed Zyprexa, such as deep-sea fishing trips and Palm- Pilot devices, said John Simmons, a Columbia, South Carolina- based lawyer representing the state.

The sales notes show that many of those prescriptions were for unapproved, or so-called off-label, uses, Simmons told Judge Roger Couch.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulates what drugs can be used to treat specific ailments. Drugmakers can only promote their medicines for FDA-specified illnesses.

Faced with the loss of patent protection for its Prozac antidepressant, Lilly officials pushed salespeople to market Zyprexa for a host of ailments, including depression, agitation and anger, Simmons said. The FDA hadn’t approved the drug for any of those uses, he added.

‘Diamond’

Company officials said in a memo that they were “betting the farm on Zyprexa” to replace Prozac, Simmons said.

In internal memos, Lilly officials used the word “diamond” as a code for talking about their Zyprexa off-label marketing campaign, he said.

He cited notes from visits with doctors in 2000 and 2001 where sales reps reported talking about older patients being treated with Zyprexa for agitation and declining mental acuity.

Simmons noted the drugmaker already pleaded guilty to a criminal charge over its off-label promotion of Zyprexa for use with elderly patients.

In that plea, Lilly officials acknowledge that the company illegally pushed the drug’s off-label use by older patients from Sept. 1, 1999, to March 31, 2001.

The company also pushed primary-care physicians to use the antipsychotic medication on children, Simmons said. One of the notes indicated salespeople said the drug is ‘for kids whose parents have to shove the pills down their throat every day.”

‘In His Tea’

Another note shows that one doctor told Lilly he was prescribing Zyprexa for a 13-year-old, whose mother “puts it in his tea.”

Besides illegally marketing its drug, South Carolina officials contend Lilly violated the state’s unfair trade practices law by mishandling Zyprexa and unjustly enriched itself at the state’s expense.

Lilly’s lawyers have countered in court filings that the company didn’t engage in fraud in its handling of Zyprexa or misrepresent the drug’s strengths and weaknesses.

They contend South Carolina officials have no evidence of illegal marketing within the state, either from private doctors or those working with state agencies.

“At least 12 state officials, including state physicians who prescribe Zyprexa, testified that they were not misled by Lilly,” the lawyers said in the filings.

The state can’t produce a single South Carolina doctor who’ll testify they’ve received “communications from Lilly regarding off-label promotion of Zyprexa,” according to the filings.

The South Carolina case is State of South Carolina v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2007-CP-42-1855, Common Pleas Court for South Carolina’s Seventh Judicial Circuit (Spartanburg).

To contact the reporters on this story: Margaret Cronin Fisk in Southfield, Michigan, at mcfisk@bloomberg.net; Jef Feeley Spartanburg, South Carolina, at jfeeley@bloomberg.net.

Labels: , , , ,

Thursday, September 3, 2009

Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case

New York Times
September 3, 2009


By GARDINER HARRIS
,
WASHINGTON — The pharmaceutical giant Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion to settle civil and criminal allegations that it had illegally marketed its painkiller Bextra, which has been withdrawn.

It was the largest health care fraud settlement and the largest criminal fine of any kind ever.

Although the investigation began and largely ended during the Bush administration, top Obama administration officials held a news conference on Wednesday to celebrate the settlement, thank each other for resolving it and promise more crackdowns on health fraud.

“It’s another step in the administration’s ongoing effort to prosecute any individual or organization that tries to rip off health care consumers and the federal government,” said Kathleen Sebelius, secretary of health and human services.

Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill have accused the Obama administration of failing to crack down adequately on health care fraud, arguing that huge savings in government health programs could be found with better enforcement. The settlement had been expected. Pfizer, which is acquiring a rival, Wyeth, reported in January that it had taken a $2.3 billion charge to resolve claims involving Bextra and other drugs. It was Pfizer’s fourth settlement over illegal marketing activities since 2002.

“Among the factors we considered in calibrating this severe punishment was Pfizer’s recidivism,” said Michael K. Loucks, acting United States attorney for the Massachusetts district.

Amy W. Schulman, Pfizer’s general counsel, said that Pfizer had reformed — again.

“The reasons to trust Pfizer are because, as I have walked the halls at Pfizer, you would see that the vast majority of our employees spend their lives dedicated to bringing truly important medications to patients and physicians in an appropriate manner,” she said.

The government charged that executives and sales representatives throughout Pfizer’s ranks planned and executed schemes to illegally market not only Bextra but also Geodon, an antipsychotic; Zyvox, an antibiotic; and Lyrica, which treats nerve pain. While the government said the fine was a record sum, the $2.3 billion fine amounts to less than three weeks of Pfizer’s sales.

Much of the activities cited Wednesday occurred while Pfizer was in the midst of resolving allegations that it illegally marketed Neurontin, an epilepsy drug for which the company in 2004 paid a $430 million fine and signed a corporate integrity agreement — a companywide promise to behave.

John Kopchinski, a former Pfizer sales representative whose complaint helped prompt the government’s Bextra case, said that company managers told him and others to dismiss concerns about the Neurontin case while pushing them to undertake similar illegal efforts on behalf of Bextra.

“The whole culture of Pfizer is driven by sales, and if you didn’t sell drugs illegally, you were not seen as a team player,” said Mr. Kopchinski, whose personal share of the Pfizer settlement is expected to exceed $50 million. Mr. Kopchinski left Pfizer in 2003.

Altogether, six whistle-blowers will collect $102 million from the federal share of the settlement and more from states’ shares. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia will collect $331 million, with New York State alone getting $66 million. Only South Carolina chose not to participate in the settlement.

As news of the riches earned by whistle-blowers spread through the industry in recent years, scores of fraud cases have been filed by former drug sales representatives using a Civil War-era law that pays a bounty for fraud alerts. The cases charge that illegal drug marketing cost the federal Medicare and Medicaid program millions.

Under the agreement with the Justice Department, Pfizer will pay a $1.3 billion criminal penalty related to Bextra and $1 billion in civil fines related to other medicines. In addition, a Pfizer subsidiary, Pharmacia and Upjohn, will plead guilty to violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for its promotion of Bextra. The company has agreed to sign another corporate integrity agreement that requires senior company executives to annually certify legal compliance and mandates that Pfizer post on its Web site many of its payments to doctors.

Consumer advocates heaped scorn on Pfizer and said that illegal marketing was still common in the drug industry.

“Consumers should ask their doctor whether the medication being prescribed is F.D.A.-approved for their condition,” advised Lisa Gill, editor of Consumer Reports Best Buy Drugs. If a drug is not approved for their condition, patients should press their doctors to explain their reasoning for the drug’s use.

Almost every major drug maker has been accused in recent years of giving kickbacks to doctors or shortchanging federal programs. Prosecutors said that they had become so alarmed by the growing criminality in the industry that they had begun increasing fines into the billions of dollars and would more vigorously prosecute doctors as well.

Dr. Scott Gottlieb, a top F.D.A. official in the Bush administration who now consults for drug makers, said that government prosecutors were increasingly criminalizing “what reasonable people might argue is a reasonable exchange of important clinical information between drug companies and doctors.”

Bextra was approved in 2001 by the Food and Drug Administration to treat arthritis and menstrual cramps. The drug was not approved for the treatment of acute pain, nor was it shown to be any more powerful than ibuprofen. But Pfizer instructed its sales representatives to tell doctors that the drug could be used to treat acute and surgical pain and at doses well above those approved, even though the drug’s dangers — which included kidney, skin and heart risks — increased with the dose, the government charged. The drug was withdrawn in 2005 because of its risks to the heart and skin.

Mr. Loucks, the prosecutor, accused Pfizer of aggressive marketing tactics.

“Among other things, Pfizer did the following: Pfizer invited doctors to consultant meetings, many in resort locations. Attendees expenses were paid; they received a fee just for being there,” he said. Such weekend getaways for doctors are still common throughout the drug and medical device industries.

Top Republican officials rarely publicized drug marketing cases or appeared during news conferences about them. Eli Lilly agreed to pay $1.4 billion over its marketing of Zyprexa, an antipsychotic, in January, before President Obama took office. The announcement was made by prosecutors in Philadelphia.

Ms. Sebelius’s decision to make the Pfizer announcement in Washington suggests that the political environment for the pharmaceutical industry has become more treacherous despite the industry’s commitment to save the government $80 billion as part of efforts to change the health care system.

Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Labels: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

Eli Lilly Ghostwrote Articles to Market Zyprexa, Files Show

Bloomberg News

By Elizabeth Lopatto, Jef Feeley and Margaret Cronin Fisk

June 12 (Bloomberg) -- Eli Lilly & Co. officials wrote medical journal studies about the antipsychotic Zyprexa and then asked doctors to put their names on the articles, a practice called “ghostwriting,” according to unsealed company files.

Lilly employees also compiled a guide to hiring scientists to write favorable articles, complained to journal editors when publication was delayed and submitted rejected articles to other outlets, according to documents filed in drug-overpricing suits against the Indianapolis-based company, the largest manufacturer of psychiatric medicines.

Drugmakers’ use of ghostwriters has created “a huge body of medical literature that society can’t trust,” said Carl Elliott, a University of Minnesota bioethicist who has written about the practice.

Lilly sought to make Zyprexa “the number one selling psychotropic in history,” according to a 2000 plan distributed to its product team. The memo was among more than 10,000 pages of internal documents unsealed last month in lawsuits by insurers and pension funds seeking to recoup money spent on the drug. They allege Lilly exaggerated Zyprexa’s effectiveness.

“Plaintiffs are releasing one-sided, cherry-picked documents obtained in discovery to selected news media in an effort to try their cases” there, said Lilly spokeswoman Marni Lemons. “Lilly remains prepared to defend ourselves against all of these allegations in the appropriate venue, a court of law.”

FDA Rules

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration doesn’t have a guidance document or regulations specific to ghostwriting, said Karen Riley, an agency spokeswoman.

Lemons declined to answer specific questions about ghostwriting. There is no evidence in the unsealed documents that doctors were paid to sign off on the ghostwritten items.

“We believe these documents describe the marketing of a widely promoted and powerfully dangerous psychotropic medication,” said Thomas Sobol, lead attorney for the insurance plans. “Transparency is critically important.”

Lilly isn’t the only drugmaker to use ghostwriters to win favorable play in medical journals. Merck & Co. and Pfizer Inc. also have faced claims they used ghostwriters as part of their marketing plans.

In May 2008, Whitehouse Station, New Jersey-based Merck agreed to pay $58 million to 29 states and to stop ghostwriting articles to resolve claims that its advertisements for the withdrawn painkiller Vioxx hid the drug’s health risks.

Improper Marketing

Employees at Merck worked alone or with publishing firms to write manuscripts on Vioxx that were published under the names of academic medical experts, according to an analysis published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in April 2008. Merck pulled Vioxx from the market in 2004.

Pfizer paid $60 million to 33 states in October to settle claims it improperly marketed its Bextra and Celebrex pain relievers. New York-based Pfizer agreed to halt off-label marketing of the medicines and stop ghostwriting about them. It withdrew Bextra in April 2005. Celebrex is still on the market.

“Every company, to some degree, has probably engaged in ghostwriting,” said Joseph Ross, an assistant professor at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York and the author of the JAMA paper on Merck’s ghostwriting practices. “It’s a challenging thing to discover without litigation, since it’s mutually beneficial to physicians and people within the industry to keep it under wraps.”

Untrustworthy

In 1996, Wyeth hired Excerpta Medica Inc., a New Jersey- based medical communications firm, to write 10 articles promoting drugs aimed at treating obesity, Elliott wrote in “Ghost Marketing: Pharmaceutical Companies and Ghostwritten Journal Articles,” published in 2007 in the journal Perspectives in Biology and Medicine.

Wyeth, which at the time was touting its fen-phen diet combination for weight loss, agreed to pay Excerpta $20,000 per article, according to Elliott.

“Wyeth kept each article under tight control, scrubbing drafts of any material that could damage sales,” he wrote. Pfizer is acquiring Madison, New Jersey-based Wyeth for $68 billion in cash and stock.

Doug Petkus, a spokesman for Wyeth, declined to immediately comment.

Antipsychotics have become the U.S.’s best-selling class of drugs, with 2008 sales of $14.6 billion, according to IMS Health, a health-care consulting firm.

The insurers suing Lilly contend it should pay as much as $6.8 billion in damages for downplaying Zyprexa’s health risks and marketing the drug for unapproved uses to increase profits.

Top Selling

The antipsychotic is Lilly’s top-selling drug, with $4.7 billion in sales last year, accounting for almost a quarter of the company’s revenue. Lilly officials said in 2002 they sought to boost Zyprexa sales to $6 billion within four years, according to a document unsealed in the insurers’ case. Bloomberg News obtained the documents after U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein in Brooklyn, New York, made them public on May 1. In September, Weinstein allowed insurers and other payers to sue Lilly as a group after finding “sufficient evidence of fraud” to let the case go to trial. Lilly appealed that ruling.

Lilly agreed in January to pay $1.42 billion to the U.S. government and more than 30 states to settle off-label marketing allegations over Zyprexa. The agreement included a $615 million penalty for a federal criminal charge of illegally marketing the drug to elderly patients for off-label uses.

The company also faces suits from 12 states over its Zyprexa marketing practices. Cases brought by South Carolina and Connecticut officials are set for trial later this year.

Positive Light

The unsealed documents support the claims of the insurers suing Lilly, said Sobol, of Seattle-based Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. His firm provided Bloomberg News with copies of the internal papers. Bloomberg News filed a letter brief asking the court to unseal the documents.

Ensuring that medical journal articles presented Zyprexa study results in a positive light was one way for Lilly to reach its sales goal, company officials said in its plan, according to the documents.

To do that, Lilly officials hired ghostwriters to prepare submissions to journals such as Progress in Neurology and Psychiatry, according to the unsealed documents.

“The paper for the Progress in Neurology and Psychiatry supplement has been completed and sent to the journal for peer review,” Kerrie Mitchell, an employee of the public relations agency Cohn & Wolfe, wrote in a Feb. 23, 2001, e-mail to Michael Sale, a Lilly marketing official. The message was among the unsealed files.

“We ‘ghost’ wrote this article and then worked with author Dr. Haddad to work up the final copy,” Mitchell said in the e- mail. Eric Litchfield, a spokesman for Cohn & Wolfe, didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment.

Draft Approved

Peter Haddad, a researcher at Greater Manchester West Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust in the U.K., was listed as the article’s lead author. Haddad didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The global Lilly team approved a draft of Haddad’s ghost- written paper in 2000, according to the unsealed documents. Lilly’s U.K. team had to give final approval to the article because Progress in Neurology and Psychiatry was based there, Mitchell said in the February 2001 e-mail.

Ghostwriter’s Guide

To ensure that ghostwritten Zyprexa articles met Lilly’s standards, company officials issued a guide to preparing them, according to the unsealed files.

The guide, “Medical Press: Pre-Launch Feature Outline,” was undated. It’s unclear from the documents which teams in Lilly’s top 10 markets for the drug received it.

The primer provided a how-to for writing articles, such as instructing the author to use Zyprexa’s generic name, olanzapine, instead of its brand moniker, according to the documents. Scientists in medical research traditionally refer to a drug’s chemical name.

The guide also offered tips on how to find authors by identifying a “key opinion leader” and providing them either an outline of the article or a finished copy. Authors could include a study investigator, an advisory board member or “Lilly-friendly” doctor, according to the documents.

A sample article laid out how a Lilly employee may find a doctor to ghostwrite a submission that would “prepare the market” for the launch of an intramuscular injectable version of the drug. It also offered an outline for the contents of the article, beginning with background on another drug, droperidol, which had been withdrawn from several countries.

The Article

The article, with the suggested title “Filling the Droperidol Gap,” noted that an anti-anxiety drug could be used, before going on to say, “more advanced IM treatments may soon be available to provide a superior alternative.” The article explained that injectable Zyprexa had just received approval from the FDA, and recounted its clinical trial history.

“The anticipated forthcoming availability of atypical antipsychotics in an IM formulation could be a major step forward in the treatment of acute agitation associated with schizophrenia,” the sample article concluded.

Lilly officials e-mailed journal editors to complain about delays in publishing favorable Zyprexa articles, according to the unsealed documents.

In one instance, Lilly employees contacted the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology about delays of an article criticizing a previously published piece linking Zyprexa, as well as the class of atypical antipsychotics, to diabetes.

E-Mail Exchange

After Suraja Roychowdhury, Lilly’s senior scientific communications coordinator, wrote to the journal in November 2002, its editor, Andre Knottnerus, replied in an e-mail that it was “a bit strange to be contacted via the Lilly product team. “Dr. Buse and coauthors can contact us directly next time.”

Knottnerus was referring to the manuscript’s lead author, John Buse, a former president of the American Diabetes Association. A copy of the Nov. 22, 2002, e-mail was included in the unsealed documents.

Patrizia Cavazzoni, a Lilly staffer who co-wrote the article, e-mailed Buse on Jan. 9, 2003, seeking permission to send a separate e-mail asking to expedite publication. She also asked Buse if he would prefer “to send it in your name?”

It isn’t clear from the e-mail chain whether the e-mail was sent by Buse or Cavazzoni. On Jan. 22, 2003, Buse e-mailed Cavazzoni to say he hadn’t heard anything and to request Knottnerus’s telephone number, according to the documents.

The Zyprexa article by Buse and Cavazzoni was a review of another submission that had previously appeared in the journal, according to the documents. That article summarized previous medical literature on atypical antipsychotics, and found Zyprexa had an increased risk of causing diabetes relative to the class.

Toned Down

Buse, a professor of medicine at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, e-mailed his comments on the article to Cavazzoni for her review on Jan. 26, 2003.

Buse indicated in the e-mail that he was worried he had been “unduly harsh” in his review of the earlier piece. He told Cavazzoni: “If you think I should tone it down, suggest a way,” according to the unsealed documents.

There was no response to the e-mail in the documents.

“I don’t remember anybody at Lilly ever approaching me for ghostwriting,” Buse said in a phone interview. Throughout his career, others had offered to put his name on papers, and he declined, Buse said. He said he couldn’t recall the names of anyone involved.

“Ghostwriting used to be quite common,” Buse said. “Now I think it’s uncommon. I’ve been at meetings where clinical trials are being completed and there’s a discussion of who’s going to write which papers, and it’s quite clear everyone’s sensitive to this issue.”

Long Period

Buse said in a Nov. 28, 2006, deposition that working with drugmakers over a long period of time can change the way doctors think about clinical problems.

“It’s sort of like Stockholm Syndrome,” Buse said in the deposition, referring to a psychological phenomenon in which kidnap victims begin to sympathize with their captors.

“I’m not saying that the pharmaceutical industry captures me,” Buse said. “But to the extent that the relationship has something above and beyond medicine, science, you know, it could cloud one’s judgment.”

Buse added that many researchers develop emotional attachments to drugs they’ve discovered or studied extensively.

‘Natural Tendency’

“There’s this natural tendency for people to fall in love with your drug: it’s like your child,” Buse said. “So you have a hard time accepting criticism.”

Barton Moffatt, a Mississippi State University bioethicist who has written about ghostwriting practices among drugmakers, said there’s a growing consensus that doctors who lend their names to such articles are engaging in “academic misconduct.”

“No one has been fired yet over this, but I think the trend is moving in that direction,” Moffatt said. “I think over the last 15 to 20 years, putting your name on a ghostwritten article has come to be seen as plagiarism.”

Lilly rose 47 cents, or 1.4 percent, to $34.38 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading yesterday. The shares have fallen 15 percent this year.

The case is UFCW Local 1776 and Participating Employers Health and Welfare Fund v. Eli Lilly & Co., 05-04115, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

Labels: , , , , , , , , ,